SFAMSS: a secure framework for atm machines via secret sharing by Ghafari, Zeinab et al.
 SFAMSS: A SECURE FRAMEWORK FOR ATM 
MACHINES VIA SECRET SHARING  
ZEINAB GHAFARI
1,TAHA ARIAN2 AND MORTEZA ANALOUI3 
1 School of Computer Engineering Iran University of Science and Technology, 
Tehran,Iran 
 z_ghafari@cmps2.iust.ac.ir 
2 School of Computer Engineering Iran University of Science and Technology, 
Tehran,Iran 
 t_arian@ce.sharif.edu 
3 Associate Professor of Computer Engineering Iran University of Science and 
Technology,Tehran,Iran 
analoui@iust.ac.ir 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 As ATM applications deploy for a banking system, the need to secure communications will 
become critical.  However, multicast protocols do not fit the point-to-point model of most 
network security protocols which were designed with unicast communications in mind. In 
recent years, we have seen the emergence and the growing of ATMs (Automatic Teller 
Machines) in banking systems. Many banks are extending their activity and increasing 
transactions by using ATMs. ATM will allow them to reach more customers in a cost effective 
way and to make their transactions fast and efficient. However, communicating in the network 
must satisfy integrity, privacy, confidentiality, authentication and non-repudiation. Many 
frameworks have been implemented to provide security in communication and transactions. In 
this paper, we analyze ATM communication protocol and propose a novel framework for ATM 
systems that allows entities communicate in a secure way without using a lot of storage. We 
describe the architecture and operation of SFAMSS in detail. Our framework is implemented 
with Java and the software architecture, and its components are studied in detailed. 
 
KEYWORDS 
ATM Security, Framework, Secret Sharing, Authentication, Protocol Design, Software 
Architecture. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Security protocols are applied on untrusted network to enhance their safety. ATM networks are 
one of the typical networks that need a high level of security to prevent the attacker doing 
malicious activity. ATM communication consists of several phases, such as authentication and 
authorization. So, establishing a comprehensive security in ATM infrastructure needs a lot of 
concerns. Lack of security even in one of the phases can lead to massive security breach. In 
order to solve this problem, we propose a new framework that includes several entities same as 
ATM, customer, and bank. To achieve security in the ATM networks each entity should 
consider the security as an important factor.  
There are some studies on designing a new protocol and their attacks on ATM. In our previous 
paper [1] we presented two security protocols for ATM  communication. In this paper, our 
motivation is to introduce a new framework that includes registration, authentication, and 
authorization. Firstly, the user and ATM register for bank's services. The bank generates 
authentication information and distributes it among them. Bank also assigns some privileges to 
users, such as the amount of money he could transfer by means of ATM. Secondly the bank 
authenticates user by ATM, and finally the bank authorizes user's request for a service, based on 
the user’s privileges. It is possible that a user be authenticated by the bank; however, he is not 
authorized for a particular service.  We implement our framework by using Java programming 
language on the Eclipse platform. Our framework will investigate as a secure framework for 
ATM machines via secret sharing (SFAMSS) in the rest of paper. 
Secret sharing schemes (SSS) are perfect for storing information that is highly confidential and 
critical. For instance encryption keys, missile launch codes, and bank account information are 
critical information that should maintain in a secure way. This information must be protected 
highly confidential, as their exposure could be harmful. Traditional methods for encryption are 
not suited for achieving high levels of confidentiality. Secret sharing aims at efficiently sharing 
a secret among a number of entities, and the secret can be recovered by entities shares. Hence, 
there are several applications of secret sharing in computer science such as [2],[3] in cloud and 
[4],[5] in data outsourcing. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 analyzes related work and Section 3 
describes the framework in particular, highlighting its main architecture and protocol details. 
Then, Section 4 illustrates the implementation, and a case study in detail. Section 5 reports the 
protocol analysis. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. RELATED WORKS 
 There is a considerable amount of literature on designing a new secure framework in network 
communication. Few studies have been published on banking systems. In [6] the authors 
proposed a framework based on a smart card that allows entities to realize secure transactions. 
The proposed solution uses smart cards to store keys and perform cryptographic algorithms in e-
business transactions. Robinson P. et.al. [7] reported a new framework for a secure protocol. 
The paper describes the implementation of a deterministic and fair non-repudiation protocol. 
Malin and Sweeney [8] presented the STRANON protocol that enables locations to cooperate 
such that health records are not revealed. They developed a general high-level framework for 
STRANON. Authors in [9] presented a new framework intended to extract FSA(Finite State 
Automaton) specifications of network protocol implementations and test it for implementation 
flaws. They constructed the framework using Java. Mittra [10] developed a novel framework for 
scalable secure multicasting this protocol can be used to achieve a variety of security objectives 
in communications. In [11] the authors investigated a new framework for network management 
protocol. They proposed an architecture composed of mobile agents. Camenisch et.al[12] 
proposed a framework for cloud security storage. They applied secret sharing scheme to prevent 
unauthorized access to cloud data. They provide a secure analysis for their protocol by using 
zero-knowledge proof. 
3. SFAMSS FRAMEWORK 
In this paper, we implement the authentication and secure communication framework for a 
distributed ATM systems, consisting of a bank server, a number of ATMs and users. Since the 
computer system at the bank is connected through an insecure communication channels to the 
ATM, applying secure mechanisms in the communication is essential. The insecure 
communication channels are subjected to attacks by active and passive malicious attacker. 
Messages may not be removed by an attacker. However, confidentiality of messages might be 
breached, and new message might be generated by the attacker. Thus, the authorship and 
content of messages that transit in the insecure communication link should be considered 
suspect. Customers use ATMs to make queries such as withdrawals and balance inquiries 
involving their accounts. Attackers must be prevented from interfering with these actions.  
 
Communications between user, ATM and bank consists of the following steps: 
1. The user inserts his smart card into the ATM. 
2. The ATM informed the customer for a password.  
3. The user selects a request to be completed by ATM, and that request is performed by the 
bank and the result is shown by the ATM to the user. 
 
3.1. SFAMSS Architecture 
 
In this section, we considered that three parties in ATM system do not trust each other among 
interaction network. So, to protect interacts among parties, communication should be 
confidential and repudiable. Confidentiality is the property that a message cannot be accessed 
by unauthorized entities. Non-repudiation is the property that an entity cannot repudiate the 
message that he send before. In this section, we present a new protocol that guarantees non-
repudiation and confidentiality. Figure 1 illustrates SFAMSS architecture with SSS component 
that changes the authentication process of ATM systems. Using SSS helps entities to 
authenticate each other without trusted third party existence.  
 
 
 
Figure 1-SFAMSS architecture 
 
 
3.2. Protocol details 
We have a certificate authority that issues certificates to all entities, so, before the registration 
phase all of the entities have their certificate and private key. In all of the protocol descriptions, 
E(keyAB)(msg) means message (msg) is encrypted by key (keyAB). Epu, Epr are referred to entity 
E public key and private key. KS is a session key which is established between user and bank. 
The ATM communicates with the bank by means of a protocol that meets the following 
requirements: 
1. ATM authenticates the user. 
2. ATM sends authentication information to the bank. 
3. It preserves the integrity and confidentiality of communications between the bank and ATM. 
Messages that are sent by the ATM to the bank provide evidence that every ATM-initiated 
action was, in fact, initiated by the user. The bank server responses to user by ATM. It also 
records information in an audit log for later use in justifying its past actions to the user. The 
audit log that is stored in bank servers is vulnerable to network attacks. So data written to the 
log should be encrypted to prevent a confidentiality breach. In addition to log, bank should keep 
accurate information about users and ATMs secretly. Since entities sign their messages, they 
cannot repudiate it. 
bankpb: Banks public key 
bankpr: Banks private key 
K(u1; bank): Session key between bank and u1 
u1pb : Users public key 
u1pr : Users private key The private key of the user is stored securely in the credit card 
ATMpb: ATMs public key 
ATMpr: ATMs private key. The private key of the ATM is stored securely at the ATM. 
 
Figure 2-Message Exchange in the selected scenario 
Our scenario is illustrated in Figure 2 and we will investigate it step by step. 
 
3.2.1.Registration of the ATM with the bank 
 
ܤܣܰܭ	 → ܣܶܯ ∶ 	 ܫܦ	஺்ெ	 
 
ATM	 → BANK: ID୅୘୑, ATMୡୣ୰୲୧୤୧ୡୟ୲ୣ 
 
[BANK	generate	function	F(x)&	calculate	D୅୘୑ = (ID୅୘୑ , F(ID୅୘୑))	] 
 
BANK → ATM ∶ E(ATM୔୙)(D୅୘୑) 
 
3.2.2.Registration of the User with the bank 
 
BANK	 → USER ∶ 	 ID୙ୗ୉ୖ 
 
USER	 → BANK ∶ 	 ID୙ୗ୉ୖ , USERେୣ୰୲୧୤୧ୡୟ୲ୣ 
 
[	BANK	generate		random	r୙ୗ୉ୖ		and	store	D୆୅୒୏,୙ୗ୉ୖ = (0, r୙ୗ୉ୖ)& 
calculate	f୬ୣ୵(x) = f(x) + r୙ୗ୉ୖ	 
&	D୙ୗ୉ୖ = (ID୙ୗ୉ୖ, f୬ୣ୵(ID୙ୗ୉ୖ))	] 
BANK → USER ∶ 	E(Kୗ)(D୙ୗ୉ୖ) 
3.2.3. Authentication of User to ATM 
 
USER	 → ATM ∶ 	 ID୙ୗ୉ୖ, SIGN(USER	pr)(ID୙ୗ୉ୖ, Tୗ), E(Ks)(D୙ୗ୉ୖ)	 
 
൥
	ATM	requests		user	certificate	from	BANK	and
	after	that	ATM	verify	the	signiture
	by	the	user	bublic	then	ATM		authenticate	USER	
 
 
3.2.4. Authentication of ATM and User to Bank 
 
ATM	 → BANK:	ID୙ୗ୉ୖ, ID୅୘୑ , E(Kୗ)(D୙ୗ୉ୖ), E(ATM୔୙)(D୅୘୑) 
 
Bank	decrypts	D୙ୗ୉ୖ	with	session	key	between 
Bank	and	User	and	decrypts	D୅୘୑	with	ATM୔୙ 
 
	and	calculate	Dᇱ୅୘୑ = (ID୅୘୑ , F(ID୅୘୑) + 	r୙ୗ୉ୖ) 
generate	Fᇱ୒୉୛(x)with	D୙ୗ୉ୖ, D′୅୘୑ , D୆୅୒୏ 
 
Fᇱ୒୉୛(x) =	?	F୒୉୛(x) 
 
4. Implementation 
 
The UML design goal is to represent the several components and technologies that will be used 
to build a framework. We implemented protocol role with Java language, in the eclipse 
platform. The UML diagram are illustrated in this hyperlink.  
 
 
Figure 3- Implementation classes 
 
4.1. Case study 
 
In the registration phase of ATM and the bank, first bank generates a key pair for ATM based 
on the RSA algorithm. Second, he stores them in the bank database. Bank generates polynomial 
function F(x) then creates D(ATM) with it. Bank encrypts D(ATM) with ATM public key and 
sends it to ATM.  
Algorithm1 :registration ATM  with BANK 
ATM establishes communication with Bank 
SET bank_pu, bank_pr 
SET F(X) = x^a + bx + c 
READ IDATM 
SEND ATM-certificate to BANK  for verification 
if failure then Display(“Bad certificate”) and exit 
end if 
SET DATM=F(ID ATM) 
SEND E (DATM) to ATM 
 
 
In phases of user registration with the bank, at the first we choose a random number R for each 
user then generate D(bank,user) that is equal to R. Now, calculate Fnew(x) which Fnew(0)=R and 
choose a random number I for ID user. Bank generates D(user)= Fnew(i) then encrypt and puts it 
on a smart card. 
 
Algorithm2 :registration USER  with BANK 
SET user_pu, user_pr 
SET random number (R) 
SET D(BANK,USER)=(0,R) 
SET Fnew(X)=F(X)+R 
SET random number (I) 
SET Duser=Fnew(I) 
SEND E(Duser) 
 
In the phases of user to bank authentication, first user authenticates with ATM. User sends 
password number to ATM with his smartcard. ATM checks if the password is correct. ATM 
extracts the Duser and Datm. 
 
Algorithm3 authentication between user and ATM 
Display(“Please enter password”) 
passwd= get input from user() 
verifyUsingSC(passwd) 
if verified then Authentication Successful 
READ Duser,Datm 
else Authentication Failed 
 
In the user and ATM authentication phase with the bank, at the first, bank retrieves 
D(bank,user) whit user ID. Then, bank calculates D’(ATM). Finally, bank interpolates new 
function F’new(x) with three points D’(ATM), D(user), D(bank,user). To verify the 
authentication among entities bank checks if F’new(x) == Fnew(x). 
 
Algorithm4 authentication among 
BANK,ATM,USER 
Bank read D(bank,user) 
SET D’atm=Datm+R 
SET interpolation F’new 
with(D’atm,Duser,D(bank,user)) 
IF F’new(x)=Fnew(x) then authentication successful 
else 
Authentication failed 
 
 
 
5. Protocol Security Analysis 
 
Security properties required by ATM systems include confidentiality, authentication, integrity 
and non-repudiation.  
  
 
Confidentiality 
 
Confidentially means guaranteeing data and important user information not to be accessed by 
unauthorized users and aliens that usually is performed using cryptography techniques. We 
encrypt messages such as shares to establish confidentiality in the communication. Thus, dues to 
the shares that we have considered exclusively for each entity, to access the main secret data, it 
is required that all the entities must be present, which results in establishing the confidentiality. 
Also the bank and ATM key pair are used to encrypt messages. This key pair used between the 
bank and the user prevents the ATM from accessing the information shared between these two 
entities, which in turn results in the confidentiality. Confidentiality of our algorithm depends on 
the number of key bits and encryption algorithm. We use RSA as a robust encryption algorithm. 
There is a trade-off between number of key bits and performance of the algorithm. If the 
number of key bits is large, protocol security is higher but encryption and decryption process 
may take longer. 
 
Integrity 
 
Integrity is needed to prevent and discover redundancy, modification, and deletion of data. 
While registering an ATM and a user in a bank, two independent certificates are issued for these 
two entities. Both certificates are signed by the user. To establish integrity, we used digital 
signature in the protocol communication. In SFAMSS, if an attacker tries to change part of the 
message, receiver can detect the changes by verifying the signature of the message. 
 
Non-Repudiation 
 
Non-repudiation prevents the sender from denying the transmission of her message. We create 
this mechanism using the signature in the scenario. Since all the signatures in our protocol use 
private key of the sender, nobody can repudiates the message that he sents before.  Because  the 
only entity who has the private key is the sender of a message. 
 
Freshness 
 
In our protocol, we use the timestamp to keep our message freshness. It ensures that the 
messages are recent, and it ensures that no attacker replayed old messages. Hence, if an attacker 
uses her previous messages to access the information, the bank detects this situation, due to the 
existence of the timestamp. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Our contribution in this paper is to present a framework for ATM systems. Our framework 
ensures confidentiality and non-repudiation and   integrity in communication between bank, 
ATM, and user. In the registration phase of ATM, bank, and user, secret shares are distributed 
among users by bank SSS module.  In the authentication phase of ATM, bank, and user, shares 
are aggregated to generate a polynomial function. Bank checks the polynomial function to 
verify if entities are authenticated. Since we use  digital signature and encryption algorithms to 
enhance the security of ATM communication protocol. We conclude that secret sharing 
schemes are suitable to use in ATM systems. In the future work, we will analyse the protocol 
with protocol verifier tools such as proverif [13]. 
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